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The Rise and Fall of Somali Nationalism 
When the Somali state was formed in 
1960, most African countries envied the 
homogeneity of the Somali people. 
Unlike the African countries south of the 
Sahara, Somalis share the same culture 
and language; they believe in the same 
religion and belong to the same ethnic 
group. This is the only perspective from 
which European scholars and African 
writers base their analysis of Somali 
studies. However, they fail to observe 
the diversity of the same culture, whichis 
an inherent characteristic of the clan 
system. 
Despite their common charac- 
teristics, Somalis did not experience a 
centralized form of administration 
before the Europeans arrived, nor did 
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was reduced. The country was divided 
into regions, districts, subdistricts and 
villages; men of the same tribe were 
found in different jurisdictions and 
sometimes under different colonial rule. 
The security and justice systems came 
under the colonial authorities. Hence, 
each tribe faced a new challenge in 
protecting its interest within the system, 
since its tribal organization and cultural 
values were in jeopardy. The traditional 
leaders had no option other than to 
submit themselves to the colonial 
administration. The only function left for 
them was to enforce solidarity among 
their followers in case of calamity or war 
and to try to defend their economic 
interests. However, the European 
dictatorship in rural areas. He also 
exacerbated hostility among the 
different Somali tribes, using divide- 
and-rule tactics. Unfortunately, he 
betrayed his position of great trust by 
alienating the Somali tribes living in the 
North, particularly the Isaaqs, whose 
firm support was essential in combat. He 
diverted the purpose of his struggle to 
settle an old account with the Isaaqs. The 
Isaaqs retaliated after they organized 
themselves. The British took advantage 
of the situation and provided arms and 
ammunition to the Isaaqs. Although 
Mohamed Abdille Hassan was defeated 
in 192OR3 the war had disastrous 
consequences for the Somali people. 
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traditional leadership that Hassan's tyranny 
was responsible fir the welfare and 
security of its followers, who lived on 
their own agricultural and grazing land. 
When the Europeans arrived in 
Somalia, they did not respect the 
territorial integrity of the different tribes 
and just drew arbitrary boundaries on 
the map to mark their zone of influence. 
Consequently, the Somali territory was 
divided into five parts: the British 
Somaliland Protectorate, the Italian 
Somaliland, the French Somali Coast, the 
Northern Frontier District of Kenya (as 
part of the British East African 
Administration). The rest of the Somali 
territory (known as Western Somaliland 
or Ogaden) was left under the rule of 
King Melenik of Ethiopia. 
The Europeans imposed new 
political structures on the Somali people, 
but they did not succeed in dismantling 
the tribal organizations. The super- 
imposed colonial system subjugated the 
traditional structure and values, so the 
power base of the traditional authority 
presence on Somali soil and the alien 
administrative system was widely 
regarded as a threat to the very existence 
of the Somali people. 
The Mullah and His Revolt 
In 1898, at the beginning of the European 
colonization in Somalia, Mohamed 
Abdille Hassan, from Ogaden, chal- 
lenged the colonial rule.' He advocated 
waging a holy war against the European 
infidels and called for the unity of the 
Somali nation. He reawakened Somali 
nationalism, which was dormant 
because of tribal divisions. The Somali 
tribes in the North willingly accepted 
him as their unopposed leader and gave 
him full support in order to restore their 
territorial integrity and independence, 
although there was old hostility between 
his tribe and the other tribes in the North. 
He waged a war against the British 
that continued from 1900-20.2 However, 
he lost the war after he established a 
closed a chapter of Somali nationalism 
As a result, Somali unification was 
widely disregarded by the population of 
the North for more than two decades. 
The Resurgence of Somali 
Nationalism 
In 1941 the British military admini- 
stration was established in the South, 
following the British victory over the 
Italiansin the Horn of Af~ica.~ The Somali 
Youth League (SYL), the first political 
party in the South, was established in 
Muqdishoin 1946.TheSYL'sagenda was 
to struggle for independence and 
unification of all the Somali territories. 
The idea was in line with the British 
policy at that time. All Somali territories, 
except French Somaliland, were under 
British control. The British were very 
keen on the strategic position of Somalia. 
Ernest Bevin, who was the British foreign 
secretary at the time, was an ardent 
supporter of Somali unification and he 
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confirmed the British government's 
commitment to maintaining the unity of 
the Somali people and territories. 
The people of the British Somaliland 
Protectorate were generally enthusiastic 
about unity. However, the traditional 
authorities in the North accepted the idea 
with reservation because of what they 
experienced during the tyranny of 
Moharned Abdille Hassan some thirty 
years before. The Somali National 
Society, the only political party in the 
North, which was established in 1935,6 
mobilized the masses and collaborated 
with the SYL leadership to preserve the 
unity of the Somali people. When the 
British government took the Somali case 
to the Security Council of the United 
Nations for settlement, the four powers 
(the United States, British, France and the 
Soviet Union) failed to agree on the 
destiny of the ex-Italian Somaliland. The 
issue was transferred to the United 
Nations General Assembly, whichvoted 
to leave the Somali case as it was before 
the war? 
It gave the Italian government the 
mandate to control the South as a United 
Nations trusteeship and to prepare the 
region for independence for ten years, 
which ended on July 1,1960. The short- 
lived political union of the Somali people 
and territories collapsed by virtue of the 
United Nations General Assembly's 
resolution. 
The Peak of Somali Nationalism 
After the British government failed to 
control all the Somali territories, it 
entered into a secret deal with Haile 
Selassie to cede an important region of 
the northern nomads' dwelling to 
Ethiopia. The agreement became ef- 
fective in November 1954 and the region 
known as the Haud and Reserved Area 
was annexed by the Ethiopian gov- 
ernment.8 The people of British 
Somaliland felt betrayed by the British 
authorities because the region was an 
important part of the traditional grazing 
land of the Protectorate. 
This new development effected a 
complete turn around of political 
awareness in Somaliland. Somali 
nationalism was revived throughout the 
territories, particularly the North. The 
Somali people realized the weaknesses 
of the tribal system. They gave their 
primary loyalty to the political leaders 
instead of to their traditional leaders. The 
North was convinced that the only way 
to retriwe the Haud and Reserved Area 
was to join forces with the South and 
develop common goals and strategies 
based on the Somali people's hope for 
independence and unification. The 
political elite in the North, who were 
organized as the Somali National 
SocietyJaterbecame the SornaliNational 
League (SNL)? They opted to unite with 
the South in order to form a strong 
government that could negotiate with 
the different European colonizers and 
the Ethiopian government for the 
liberation and the unification of all 
Somali territories. 
The Formation of the Somali State 
In the North, the new political elite 
benefited from Western education; they 
were devoted to Somali nationalism 
based on unity and brotherhood. They 
suppressed traditional leadership and 
values and advocated creating a strong 
central government based on 
democratically-elected political repre- 
sentation. Unfortunately, their nation- 
alistic views were not based on sound 
political judgement. They could not 
foresee the government's role and the 
type of institutions needed to preserve 
checks and balances in the system, nor 
did they think of ways to protect the 
interests of their region after unification 
with the South, let alone power-sharing 
and regional representation in the central 
government. 
The South was politically prepared 
for independence and already had a 
council of ministers and chamber of 
deputies. These gave the region 
experience in real politics and power 
profiteering. The political elite in the 
South, strugghng for power, was divided 
on triballines and was not enthusiastic to 
unite with the North because they were 
not ready to share government privileges 
at any cost. By contrast, the political 
leaders of the North, who were not fully 
aware of the political situation in the 
South, wanted to forge the basis of 
Somali unity. 
Some preliminary discussions took 
place in April 1960 between the 
authorities of the two regions.1° The 
political leaders in the South were very 
sceptical of the union, were not 
cooperative and wanted to abort the 
unification procedure by insisting on 
their own terms: 
That unification of the two regions 
must not require power-sharing. 
That the two regions must be fully 
integrated with a central admini- 
stration system. 
That the capital must be Muqdisho, 
the capital aty of the South. 
Immediately after independence on June 
26,1960, the political leadership of the 
North went to Muqdisho and signed the 
protocol of unification five days later on 
July 1. The protocol was in accordance 
with the terms of the South. Northern 
politicians sacrificed their political 
ambition and regional interests for the 
sake of national unity because there was 
a great surge of patriotic feeling in the 
North. 
Although the two regions were 
united, the legal process was not 
respected. The protocol of unification 
was not ratified by the two chambers of 
deputies in the North and the South 
separately as normal constitutional 
procedures stipulated, nor has there 
been a referendum on unification since 
then. The two chambers of deputies were 
merged. Adem Abdalle Osman was 
elected from the South as the first 
president of the new state and a central 
government was formed immediately. 
Hence, the government of Muqdisho 
ruled the North without any legal 
grounds for doing so. Once the chamber 
of deputies in the North became an 
integral part of the Somali parliament, 
there was no institution left in the North 
to represent the region. The hrty-three 
deputies from the North became a 
minority in the Somali Parliament, which 
included ninety deputies from the South. 
Regional parliamentary representation 
was not abased on a population census, 
but was individually determined by the 
two colonial authorities and the issue 
was never reviewed to rectify this. 
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Southern Domination 
When the State of Somalia was 
established, the North was better 
educated and its economy was better 
organized with a well balanced budget 
that was capable of generating some 
surplus, while the budget of the South 
was experiencing chronic deficit." 
However, the North was largely 
underrepresented in the first gov- 
ernment of the new state. Out of fourteen 
ministers, only four with minor 
portfolios were from the North: the 
deputy prime minister with no specific 
responsibilities, the minister of defence, 
the minister of education and the deputy 
minister of agriculture. All the key 
positions were filled by men from the 
South. The key positions of government 
institutions, including military and 
police forces, were also dominated by 
so~therners?~ 
In short, the executive and legislative 
bodies, along with other important 
institutions, were dominated by the 
South. This was in line with the policy 
formulated by the political leadership of 
the South who wanted to exclude the 
North from decision making. The 
political elite in the South did not 
consider the fragihty of national unity, 
whichwasin jeopardy. Frustrated young 
military officersin the North attempted a 
military coup in 1961 in an attempt to 
break away from the South. Although 
the coup was soon aborted, it was widely 
condoned by northeners who were 
deeply frustrated by southern 
domination. 
The Policy of Regionalism 
The policy of civilian governments from 
1960 to 1969 lacked a broader vision to 
cope with national issues. Political 
leaders in the South were very 
shortsighted and envious of the 
economic development in the North, as 
compared to that in the South. They 
gambled with regional issues and 
committed themselves to dismantling 
the few institutions devisedby theBritish 
to serve the interests of the people in the 
North. The Somali government 
downgraded the education system, 
health care, the media, etc. and did not 
provide sufficient funds to sustain these 
systems in the North, let alone undertake 
a development program in the region. At 
the same time, large-scale development 
projects implemented in the South 
contributed less than 20 percent in 
government revenue. Moreover, the 
North was deprived of its share of 
international development aid because 
95 percent of the bilateral and 
multilateral aid were spent in the South. 
After more than thirty years of 
independence, the govemment has not 
established anything in the North that is 
worth mentioning. Furthermore, the 
political system in the country was 
in 1971.13 However, he followed the 
policy established by his predecessors 
with regard to regional and tribal issues. 
He went too far in obliterating the 
economic base of the North in the name 
of socialism. He nationalized business, 
agriculture and the international trade. 
This had a tremendous impact on the 
national economy, particularly in the 
North, where people were entrepreneurs 
par excellence. However, the Ogaden 
war in 1977 was a turning point when the 
Somali government wrongfully waged a 
war against Ethiopia over the Ogaden 
instead of looking for a political solution. 
As a result, the nation's meagre economic 
resources were diverted for military 
When the State of Somalia was established, the North was better 
educated and i t s  economy was better organized with a well 
balanced budget that was capable of generating some surplus, 
while the budget of the South was experiencing chronic deficit. 
However; the North was largely underrepresented in the jh t  
government of the new state. 
geared to create regionalism-North 
versus South-and tribal conflict 
throughout the country. Regional and 
tribal antagonism persisted until 
President Abdirashid Ali Sharmake was 
assassinated, which opened the door for 
a military rule. 
The Military Rule 
When Siad Barre came to power in a 
military coup on October 21, 1969, he 
immediately transformed the country, 
with help from the Soviets, from a state of 
anarchy to a personal rule. Institutions 
were created for espionage and 
counterespionage, and special courts 
were formed for so-called subversive 
actions and political crimes that were 
considered antirevolutionary. A wife 
was recruited to spy on her husband and 
a son was appointed to report on the 
family sactivities. This systemdestroyed 
the family unit and social values, and 
trust became a rare commodity. This new 
and efficient political system allowed 
Siad Barre to rule Somalia by will, 
particularly after he embraced socialism 
purposes. Moreover, SiadBarre declared 
the North as a war zone and the military 
governor in the North was ordered to 
confiscate private properties in the 
region for the war effort. 
By the end of the war in 1978, Somalia 
was hosting 1.5 million refugees from 
Ethiopia, 750,000 of whom were from 
Ogaden, and the national economy was 
not in good shape.14 Living standards 
deteriorated and government services 
and institutions collapsed because of a 
lack of funds. The recession was severe 
and inflation was out of control. 
Consequently, corruption was rampant 
among civilians and the military in 
power. There was misuse of govemment 
funds and appropriation of private 
properties to supplement incomes. 
In April 1978 some army officers 
attempted a coupJ5 Although the coup 
was foiled, it exposed the oppressive 
nature of the Siad Barre's regime as 
Hassan (l984,5) notedJ6 SiadBarre ruled 
Somalia with an iron fist. Injustice, 
intimidation, mass arrests, summary 
executions and lawlessness became 
hallmarks of the regime. This incited 
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mass discontent. A group of military and 
civilian dissidents founded the Somali 
Democratic Action Front (SODAF) in 
1978, the first resistance movement to 
challenge the system.17 As the key 
leaders of the front were fromthe eastern 
regions of Somalia, the military 
government waged a war against the 
civilians in that area. Thousands of 
defenceless civilians lost their lives in a 
scorched-earth policy. Although the 
SODAF (later known as the Somali 
Salvation Democratic Front) was well 
organized and well equipped, it failed to 
sufficiently mobilize the masses in order 
to get a broad popular base. 
In April 1981 there was a renewed 
effort to create a strong opposition. A 
group of intellectuals and former senior 
civil servants, who were mainly from the 
North, formed the Somali National 
Movement (SNM). The SNM's main 
objective was to restore democracy in the 
country. As soon as the SNM was 
launched, a military command was 
formed for ethnic cleansing. It was 
known as the Dabar Goynta Isaaqa (the 
Isaaq Exterminators).18 The northern 
Isaaq clans were deprived of their legal, 
economic and social rights. By late 1981, 
hundreds of prominent Isaaqs were 
detained, private properties were 
confiscated and businesses were looted 
and closed. The policy of economic 
destabilization in the region was openly 
adopted by the military governor at the 
time, General Mohamed Hashi Ghani, a 
relative of General Siad BarreJ9 
The military command in the North 
occupied the region by force and 
committed atrocities towards innocent 
civilians. According to Lewis (1990,58) 
in 1985 the North was like a colony under 
oppressive foreign control.20 The Isaaqs' 
animosity towards military forces forced 
them to side with the opposition. The 
SNM tookadvantage of the situation and 
succeeded in getting total support from 
the Isaaqs and substantial popularity in 
the South. Siad Barre, who prolonged his 
rule by pitting different tribes against 
each other, used the military to end the 
conflict. The government's hostility 
towards the Isaaqs intensified in 1988 
when the SNM defeated the military in 
the North and captured Hargeisa, the 
capital city of the North. Siad Barre 
ordered war against the Isaaqs and used 
the military to destroy their homeland. 
Moreover, the Ogaden refugees were 
encouraged to fight against the Isaaqs 
and to take their properties and homes in 
order to cleanse them from their 
homeland. In 1988 over 50,000 civilians 
were killed in Hargeisa, and Hargeisa 
and Burao were reduced to rubble.21 
Survivors escaped to the rural areas, but 
the government troops, including the air 
force, turned on these defenceless and 
innocent civilians. Consequently, more 
than 300,000 people took refuge in 
Ethiopia, while over a million refugees 
were uprooted from their dwellings and 
scattered in the countryside. This mass 
destruction was the final episode in thvty 
The Somali people urgently 
need a political solution to 
ease their plight, but any 
foreign military intervention 
may escalate hostilities. 
years of political failure of Somalia's 
southern-based leadership. 
Siad Barre's power base was 
exclusively derived from his clan 
Mareehaan, but he received tactical and 
intermittent support from the different 
clans of the Darood tribe, of which 
Mareehaan was one. The government 
tightened its grip on the capital. The 
Hawiye clans around Muqdisho, 
together with some other small tribes, 
took up arms against the military 
government. 
The SNM, which failed to recruit all 
the opposition groups, realized that it 
could not depose Siad Barre without the 
assistance of other main tribes. The SNM 
entered a military agreement with the 
United Somali Congress (USC), an 
oppositionmovement formedin January 
1989 by dissidents of the Hawiye tribe, 
and the Somali Patriotic Movement 
(SPM), a small group from the Ogaden 
clan. Siad Barre, as usual, used his 
Darood clans against the opposition 
coalition in order to protect his regime, 
but this time it was too late because the 
militants were fighting in his courtyard. 
The presence of the Hawiye-dominated 
USC in the opposition alliance was an 
important factor in ending the military 
dictatorship. Siad Barre was defeated on 
January 27,1991, but his legacy included 
long-lasting hostilities among the Somali 
tribes, particularly those in the South. 
Moreover, the defeat of the military 
government and the weak organization 
of the opposition movement created a 
power vacuum in Muqdisho. Once Siad 
Barre was ousted, a power struggle 
started among the USC leaders. As a 
result, the undisciplined USC freedom 
fighters started to take their revenge on 
the Darood clans and confiscated their 
properties. A USC faction based in 
Muqdisho unilaterally appointed Ali 
Mahdi Mohamed as head of state and 
formed a government without the 
consent of the USC military wing and the 
other two liberation movements, the 
SNM and the SPM. Immediately 
afterward, two factions of the USC 
confronted each other with arms." 
The SNM, frustrated with the chaos 
in Muqdisho, yielded to pressure from 
the masses in the North, who opted to 
form an independent state in the 
region.23 As soon as the North seceded, 
the war escalated in Muqdisho between 
the two USC factions, led by Ali Mohdi 
Mohamed, the interim president, and the 
popular Mohamed Farah Aideed, the 
secretary general of the USC, to 
determine by force whose authority 
should prevail in the capital. However, 
the combat is no longer about political or 
ideological differences but about simple 
interclan conflict. As a result, the South 
has fallen into anarchy and all 
government institutions in Muqdisho 
have collapsed. Consequently, indi- 
vidual tribes have proclaimed their 
independence from Muqdisho. 
The catastrophic situation in Somali 
urgently requires a political solution to 
ease the people's plight, but any foreign 
military intervention may escalate 
hostilities. However, the international 
community has a significant and positive 
role to play in current Somali affairs by 
encouraging the handling of politics 
according to Somali traditions. s 
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